ABSTRACT He et al. proposed a certificateless provable data possession protocol for big data storage on cloud. They claimed that the scheme is not only secure, but also can achieve data integrity checking without downloading the stored data from the cloud server. However, in this paper, we show that He et al.'s protocol has some security flaw and cannot get the property of data integrity checking at all. Specifically, by observing certificateless signature used in their provable data possession protocol, we find that the cloud server (or any user who gets signature-message pairs) can generate a valid signature of any message. Then, the cloud server can tamper data stored by the data owner and successfully passes the data integrity checking via two different conditions according to the verifier knows or does not know the identity of blocks of data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing being a cutting-edge technology is one of the major technological revolutions in the century. It has led in a significant amount of data stored, computed and applied in big data. It has enormous advantage in applications of resource-limited, such as mobile devices, smart devices, smart city and wireless body area networks.
With these rapid applications emerged in cloud computing, serval security challenge in these area have been taken into account from distinct security requirements, such as searchable keyword [1] - [3] , outsourcing computation of decryption [4] - [10] and provable data possession (PDP) [11] - [16] .
Since the data stored in the cloud server cannot be controlled by the data owner, the data owner or delegatedly trusted third party needs to remotely check their integrity via the Internet. The first PDP scheme proposed by Ateniese et al. [11] , aimed at making sure that the cloud server really stores data of the data owners, but some of them were not deleted nor tampered. To solve the problem of the certificate management, identity-based cryptography [17] is a perfect solution, which can work out the problem. Thus, identity-based provable data possession (ID-PDP) [18] - [20] was proposed to solve the problem of the certificate management and the data integrity of the data stored in the cloud can be remotely checked in the same time. The key The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jiafeng Xie. generation center (KGC) can produce the private key of any identity in the id-based cryptography, which causes the key escrow problem. The certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) [21] proposed by Al-Riyami and Paterson can cover the security shortage. In the notion a user's private key includes a secret value selected by the user and a partial private key by generated by the KGC. For a certificateless cryptographic scheme, it is necessary to take into account two types of possible adversaries [21] , [22] , that is: wicked clients (Type-I) and malicious key generation center (KGC) (Type-II). The former, who is able to replace any user's public key, but it cannot get the master key; while the latter, who is able to get the master key, but cannot replace any user's public key. The first certificateless provable data possession (CL-PDP) scheme was proposed by Wang et al. [23] , but their scheme is not secure against Type I adversary since any Type I adversary can replace the user's public key via selecting a random value. Later, another CL-PDP scheme was presented by He et al. [24] , which is based on bilinear pairings. However, the CL-PDP scheme does not consider the property of preserving data privacy. Sequentially, they put forth a new CL-PDP scheme [25] , which attempted to solve the security risk.
In this article, we analyze the security of the CL-PDP scheme proposed by He et 
II. PRELIMINARY
Here, we first recall some basic mathematical knowledge which will be used.
A. BILINEAR PAIRING
Let an additive group G 1 and a multiplicative group G 2 have the same prime order q, the multiplicative group Z * q be subset of the finite field F q . A bilinear map e : [26] satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinearity: For any P, Q, T ∈ G 1 , e(P, Q + T ) = e(P, Q)e(P, T ), and e(P + Q, T ) = e(P, T )e(Q, T ).
• Non-degeneracy: For any non-identity elements P 1 , P 2 ∈ G 1 , e(P 1 , P 2 ) = 1 G 2 , where 1 G 2 is the identity element of G 2 .
• Computability: For any elements P 1 , P 2 ∈ G 1 , there is a polynomial-time algorithm to compute e(P 1 , P 2 ). Definition 1: Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH problem). Let G be an additive group above. Given (P, aP, bP) ∈ G 3 1 for some a, b ∈ Z * q , to compute abP.
B. MODEL OF CL-PDP
In a CL-PDP protocol the system should consist of four distinct entities: Key Generation Center(KGC), Data Owner(DO), the Cloud server(CS) and the Verfier.
• KGC: A trusted entity, generates all users' partial private key, and generates and publishes system public parameters.
• DO : It has massive data uploaded to the CS and can perform the remote data integrity checking with the help of the Verifier.
• CS: A untrusted entity, manages the data stored by DO and generates a proof for responding a challenge of checking data integrity from the Verifier.
• Verifier : A semi-trusted entity, checks the integrity of the data stored in the cloud server.
C. SECURITY MODEL OF CL-PDP
A CL-PDP scheme has some requirements [25] .
• Public verifiability: To improve efficiency of verifying integrity, a CL-PDP scheme should be able to provide pubic verifiability. That is to say, a verifier can verify the integrity of data without downloading the data from the cloud server.
• Storage correctness: Only the correct data stored in the cloud server can be executed to verify the data integrity.
• Privacy preserving: The verifier should not enable to extract the data during the verification.
• Batch verification: To efficiency, the verifier should process a number of verification at batch. A CL-PDP scheme includes five algorithms Setup, KeyGen, TagGen, ProofGen, and ProofVerify. The detailed is described as follows.
• Setup: On input the security parameter k, the algorithm outputs the public system parameters SP and the master key msk. Let SP be public and the master key msk be secret.
• KeyGen: On input the system public parameters SP, the master key msk, and an identity ID O , it is run interactively by the KGC and data owner with its identity ID O to create the private key sk O and public key pk O (including ID O ) of the data owner.
• TagGen: The data owner O generates tags T i of blocks m i .
• ProofGen: On input the file block-tag pairs {(m i , T i )} and a challenge set Set, the cloud server produces a proof pf and sends it to the verifier.
• ProofVerify: It is an interactive proof system between the cloud server and the verifier. At last the verifier outputs ''success'' or ''failure''.
D. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND MODEL
In the model, there are two types of adversaries, that is:
(1) Type-I adversary, who has the ability to perform the replacement of any user's public key, but A 1 cannot obtain the master key; (2) Type-II adversary A 2 , who has the ability to obtain the master key, but cannot perform the replacement of any user's public key. The security of the CL-PDP scheme is formally defined by a game played between an adversary A ∈ {A 1 , A 2 } and a challenger C. At the beginning of the game, C runs Setup algorithm to produce the system parameters and returns them to A. Upon the completion of the Setup algorithm execution, A makes the below queries to C [25] . C executes Partial-Private-Key, Extract, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Public-Key and Set-Private-Key, which are in the KeyGen algorithm, to generate the respective private key and his/her public key pk U = {T U , P U , Q U }. C then returns to A.
• Partial-Private-Key(ID U ) : C returns the partial private key D U = {s U , T U } to A.
• Public-Key-Replacement(ID U , pk U ) : C replaces pk U with pk U , where pk U = {T U , P U , Q U }.
• Secret-Value(ID U ) : C returns the secret value x U to A.
• TagGen(ID U , id i , m i ) : C executes TagGen algorithm to produce a tag and sends it to A. Al last, A forges a proof {ω * , R * , S * } with respect to
We say A wins in the above game, if and only if the following conditions are satisfied.
• True ← ProofVerify(ID We first review the CL-PDP scheme proposed by He et al. , and then analyze its security.
A. REVIEW OF THE CL-PDP SCHEME
The CL-PDP scheme [25] includes five algorithms below.
• Setup: This algorithm is run by KGC to output the system parameters SP as follows.
-Pick groups G 1 and G 2 of order q to produce a bilinear map e : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 , with a generator P of G 1 , where q is prime. Pick secure hash functions
-Randomly Pick a master key s of Z * q , and calculate P pub = sP and keep it secret. Set SP = {G 1 , G 2 , q, P, e, h,h, H ,H , P pub }.
• 
as its private/public key pair.
• TagGen: O wants to upload the encrypted data M which is divided into a blocks set {m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n }. It generates tags of the blocks as follows.
-For i = 1 to n, the data owner calculates
where
, and the unique identity of m i is id i .
to the cloud server.
• ProofGen: A verifier selects a random subset J of the set {1, 2, · · · , n} for the data Dname M , and generates a challenge {(i, w i )} i∈J , where w i ∈ Z * q . When the cloud server receives the challenge, it produces a proof below.
-The cloud server picks randomly r ∈ Z * q , and calculates
S).
At last, the cloud server responds (R, S, ω) to the verifier.
• ProofVerify: When the verifier receives the proof (R, S, ω), it begins to check the data integrity below.
-The verifier calculates
-Then it checks the equation
(αR + S, P).
If above equation holds, the stored data are correct and not modified with high probability; Otherwise, the data have been modified.
B. ANALYSIS OF THE CL-PDP SCHEME
We analyze security of the CL-PDP protocol from the following steps. We first analyze the security of the certificateless signature scheme used in the CL-PDP protocol, and then show the CL-PDP is not secure by two possible cases.
1) THE TAG CAN BE TAMPERED
From the security model, we know there are two types of adversaries, Type-I adversary and Type-II. Type-I adversary A 1 can replace any user's public key except obtaining the master key; while Type-II adversary A 2 can set the master key except replacing the user's public key. We consider a weaker forger A 3 who only knows some tags of some messages (some signatures of the corresponding messages). In fact, this type adversary exists, such as the untrusted cloud server, anyone who eavesdrops the channel. Obviously, if a CL-PDP protocol isn't secure for the adversary A 3 , then it always isn't secure for A 1 and A 2 , respectively. When the data owner generates tags of data M which is divided into {m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n } and sends these VOLUME 7, 2019 tag/message pairs
to the cloud server. Here, we firstly view id i as a random number in {0, 1} * (id i is the unique identity of m i ). Since the cloud server is untrusted, that means the adversary A 3 can obtain all data stored in it. This is equivalent to that the adversary can make some signature queries. Thus, A 3 can computes
For any messageM which is divided into {m 1 ,m 2 , · · · ,m n },
Then, A 3 sets (id i ,S i ) as a tag of the messagem i .
Because we havẽ
Thus, (id i ,S i ) is a valid tag of the messagem i and id i is the unique identity of the messagem i .
Note: Above attack is based on that the user cannot know the identity id i of the block m i .

2) THE CL-PDP IS INSECURITY
As discussion above, the adversary A 3 can construct a tag for any message, but not for any identity id i which is the unique identity of the message m i . That is to say, when A 3 forges some signatures for any message, it must use the identity id i which ever had used to construct some tags for some messages by the data owner.
In general, when the data owner generates the tags {(id i , S i )} for the data M , it will delete these local copies except some name Dname M of the data file the length of which is much less than the length of the data M . The cloud server knows the tuple (tag, message, Dname M ). From the CL-PDP protocol proposed by He et al, it seems that the verifier stores the identity id i of the block m i of the data for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n} (Because it did not claim that how the verifier Verifier got the identity id i of m i ). If the verifier doesn't store {id i } n i=1 , then it cannot calculateĤ (id i ) and run the ProofVerify algorithm. Thus we discuss two cases, the verifier stores all identities id i and doesn't store any identity id i , respectively.
(a) The verifier (or data owner) keeps the ({id i } i , Dname M ). When the data owner uploads the tag/block pairs {((id i , S i ), m i )} i∈{1,··· ,n} for any message M , the cloud server computes
and stores ({V j } j∈{1,··· ,n} , Dname M ). Later, when a verifier wants to check the data integrity and generates a random challenge {(i, w i )} i∈J , where w i ∈ Z * q and J ⊂ {1, · · · , n}.
On receiving the challenge, the cloud server generates a proof as follows.
• The cloud server picks two random elements r, m ∈ Z * q , computes
• The cloud server sends (R, S, ω) to the verifier. Obviously, we have e(αR + S, P)
The verifier can pass the verification. But we know that the cloud server only stores all {V j } j∈{1,··· ,n} with data's name Dname M . Thus, the cloud server successful tampers the data uploaded by the data owner.
(b) The verifier (or data owner) only keeps the Dname M . While the data owner uploads a mass of data, the cloud server stores and updates some information of the data which the number of blocks of is maximum. That is to say, when the data owner uploads the tag/block pairs ((id i , S i ), m i ), if the number of the blocks is more than the number of data stored in the server, the cloud server computes
and stores {V j } j∈{1,··· ,n max } , where the number of blocks be n max . Later, a verifier wants to perform the data integrity checking protocol and generates a random challenge {(i, w i )} i∈J , where w i ∈ Z * q and J is always a subset of {1, · · · , n max }. On receiving the challenge, the cloud server generates a proof as follows.
• The cloud server picks up two random element r, m ∈ Z * q , computes It is similar to verify that (R, S, ω) can also pass the ProofVerify algorithm.
Since the cloud server is untrust, it possibly tampers the data stored by the data owner in order to reduce the storage cost. Compared with the two cases, for the former the cloud server needs to store {(x O + s O )H (id i )} i∈{1,··· ,n} for any data M ; while for the latter the cloud server only stores {(x O + s O )H (id i )} i∈{1,··· ,n max } of the data M which the number of blocks of data is maximum.
Compared with the two possibilities, the more information the verifier gets from the data owner, the more data the cloud server needs to store. The detailed is in TABLE 1. 
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first have shown a serious security issue on certificate signature scheme used in the CL-PDP protocol proposed by He et al. [25] . The security issue showed that the cloud server can easily generate a valid signature (tag) of any message when it received the data owner's data, and then the cloud server can generate the proof for any challenge produced by the verifier, which can pass the remote integrity.
